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VINCENT BLASI

A READER’S GUIDE TO JOHN MILTON’S
AREOPAGITICA, THE FOUNDATIONAL
ESSAY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
TRADITION

Fittingly, the most imaginative and densely suggestive of the classic
arguments for free speech was written by a poet. Had his career unfolded as he wished, John Milton would never have produced his renowned Areopagitica of 1644. It was only with great reluctance that he
undertook to engage in prose polemics during the English Civil War,
sacriﬁcing his “calm and pleasing solitariness” to “embark in a troubled sea of noises and hoarse disputes.”1 He described pamphleteering
as something he did “with the left hand” all the while “knowing myself
inferior to myself.”2 Posterity, always a Miltonic concern, has begged
to differ with this self-assessment. Wherever the Areopagitica ranks on
Milton’s daunting list of enduring creations, it has proved to be the
foundational essay of the Anglo-American free speech tradition.

Vincent Blasi is the Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties at Columbia Law School.
Author’s note: Special thanks to Thomas Healy, whose insightful critique at the Yale Free
Expression Scholars Conference sent me back to the drawing board.
1
John Milton, The Reason of Church Government Against Prelaty (1642), in Merritt Y.
Hughes, ed, John Milton, Complete Poems and Major Prose 640, 671 (Macmillan, 1957).
2

Id at 667.
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I. The Setting
Born in 1608, John Milton grew up in a London that was experiencing rapid growth and transformation as a result of the increasing importance of international trade, a redirection of the nation’s
economy that produced a versatile and politically assertive urban middle class. He was the eldest son of a prosperous scrivener, a profession
that entailed the preparation and notarization of ﬁnancial documents,
some money lending and investment counseling, and intermittent
contact with legal solicitors. It was assumed that the scrivener’s prodigiously talented ﬁrst son would become a clergyman, the natural
career for someone bookishly inclined. (His second son, Christopher,
became a distinguished lawyer and judge.)
Events intervened, however. Shortly after Milton completed his
studies at Cambridge, the Church of England experienced a theological purge imposed by William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury
in the service of King Charles I. Laud’s version of church doctrine
and discipline was viewed by Protestant reformers, and especially
Puritans, as too devoted to ritual and ecclesiastical hierarchy and too
neglectful of preaching, in those respects bearing a suspicious afﬁnity
to Catholicism. Milton, whose habit of intense scriptural study and
personal interpretation was formed at an early age, realized that he
could not serve such a church. The path of preaching thereby blocked,
he decided upon a different way to serve his God: writing Christian
poetry. To that end, he devoted the better part of the decade of his
twenties (living at home at his parents’ expense) to the study of ancient and medieval history and literature. He was particularly drawn
to the epic poetry of Homer and Virgil. He dreamt of one day writing
an English epic.
In 1640 Charles was forced to call the ﬁrst Parliament in eleven years
by his need for money to ﬁnance a war with Scottish Covenanters
which erupted when he tried to impose the Anglican Prayer Book on
a largely Presbyterian populace. The occasion of Parliament assembling brought forth a multitude of grievances against a decade’s worth
of assertions of royal prerogative that critics claimed were both a
threat to the Reformation and a violation of the common law and the
Ancient Constitution. Notably, these grievances were aired not only
in the houses of Parliament but in the streets of London. Never before had England witnessed so much petitioning, pamphleteering,
and mass demonstrating over matters of theology, war, politics, and
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governance.3 A gifted writer, in the estimation of others as well as
himself, Milton felt a responsibility to do his part. He became a controversialist, a diversion from his poetic calling that would consume
the bulk of his writing time for the next twenty years.
He entered the political fray in 1641 writing ﬁve pamphlets calling
for the complete abolition of the Anglican ofﬁce of bishop. Eventually, Parliament abolished episcopacy, but not until it had defeated
the King after four years of civil war. In the meantime, Milton turned
to other subjects: the legitimate grounds for divorce, the reform of
education, and the liberty of the press. His polemical efforts during
the civil war and its aftermath culminated in six pamphlets defending the Rump Parliament’s execution in 1649 of King Charles I. In
several, Milton served as the ofﬁcially-designated spokesperson for
his country. These erudite disquisitions, some written in Latin, were
addressed not only to the English people but also the political leaders
and intellectuals of Europe. He wrote them while going blind.
Despite the importance and ferocity of the continent-wide debate
over the regicide, Milton’s most stressful experience as a polemicist
occurred six years earlier when he produced a bold pamphlet arguing
that temperamental or spiritual incompatibility constitutes a legitimate ground for divorce. Torrents of abuse rained down on him for
advancing this view. (The conventional understanding was that only
inﬁdelity, impotence, or cruelty justiﬁes divorce.)4 He published his
tract in violation of a law that had been passed by Parliament two
months before, the Licensing Order of 1643. Apparently, Milton
sought to comply with that law’s requirement that all publications be
approved by a parliamentary committee before being circulated, but
he was denied permission. Undeterred, Milton arranged for his pamphlet to be published nevertheless.
The licensing of books and pamphlets was nothing new in England. Immediately upon Gutenberg’s new invention crossing the
English Channel in 1476, the crown asserted monopoly control over
the act of printing, originally restricting the privilege to ofﬁcial printers
in London, Oxford, and Cambridge. With the outbreak of the Ref-

3
See David Cressy, England on Edge: Crisis and Revolution 1640–1642 290–302 (Oxford,
2007).
4
See Annabel Patterson, Milton, Marriage, and Divorce, in Thomas N. Corns, ed, A Companion to Milton 279–80 (Blackwell, 2001).
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ormation in the mid-sixteenth century and the growth in literacy that
it encouraged and fed off of, administration of the system for licensing
books and pamphlets became an important component of statecraft.5
During Queen Elizabeth’s long reign (1559–1603), the power to license religious and political publications was applied rather ﬂexibly in
the effort to head off fractious political controversy along religious
lines. Although Puritan preachers were denied appointments to livings in the Church of England, they were for the most part permitted
to preach freelance, often attracting large followings, and to publish
their sermons, a source of income crucial to their support.6
Licensing moved to the center of the political stage only during the
early seventeenth century, when the Stuart monarchs James I and
Charles I, particularly the latter advised by Archbishop Laud, sought
to tighten the licensing system in support of royal authority and established theology.7 When Parliament set about in 1640–43 to challenge royal prerogative on a broad front, two of the casualties were
the Court of High Commission and the Star Chamber, both of which
had been deeply involved in administering the licensing system. Grievances of other kinds led to the abolition of those two much reviled royal
institutions, but an important consequence of their demise was an unaccustomed hiatus in licensing.
Presses were suddenly free. The result was an unprecedented outpouring of unbounded, arguably blasphemous disputation in print
that surprised and alarmed the Parliament and much of the nation. It
was feared that the venting of political divisions and radical religious
nostrums would weaken military resolve and provoke divine displeasure. Such concerns engendered the Licensing Order of 1643. Ironically, the only precedent available to Parliament for how to construct
and administer a licensing regime was the old royal system. Enforcement was placed in the hands of parliamentary committees and their
staffs rather than Church of England bureaucrats, but other than that
the previous practices were more or less reinstated. Specialized licensers were appointed to examine writings in speciﬁed categories.

5
See Fredrick Seaton Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England 1476–1776 21–37, 64 –87
(Illinois, 1952).
6
On Elizabethan regulation of dissident writing, see generally Cyndia Susan Clegg, Press
Censorship in Elizabethan England (Cambridge, 1997).
7
See generally Cyndia Susan Clegg, Press Censorship in Jacobean England (Cambridge, 2001);
Cyndia Susan Clegg, Press Censorship in Caroline England (Cambridge, 2008).

7]

MILTON AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

277

Four censors were named, for example, to scrutinize law books, three
for books of philosophy and history, one for “mathematics, almanacks, and prognostications.” Not only miscreant authors and their
printers but also licensers who had been too permissive were subject
to imprisonment.8
Milton thought the Order was a dispiriting and disillusioning relapse by Parliament. He had imagined that free thought within the
Protestant community in the service of completing the Reformation
was part of what Parliament and its supporters were ﬁghting for in
risking their lives and fortunes to challenge the King. Friends and
political allies importuned him to lend his polemical talents to their
cause of persuading Parliament to repeal the Licensing Order. Milton obliged. On November 23, 1644, he published Areopagitica; A
Speech of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, to the
Parlament of England. The pamphlet appeared on the streets of London without the required imprimatur but with the author’s name
(though not his printer’s) in bold letters, as if in ostentatious deﬁance
of the licensing requirement. So far as posterity is concerned, he
needn’t have bothered. Nobody else, then or later, could possibly have
written this pamphlet or anything like it.
II. Framing
The title alludes to a written speech of the Greek orator Isocrates presented in 355 B.C. to the Athenian Ecclesia, which set a precedent of an ordinary citizen submitting a written petition to a lawmaker.9 Such presumption we take for granted today, but it was not
so in Milton’s day. Citizens petitioning Parliament, often in huge
crowds, was both common in the 1640s and also widely condemned.
It was a much-mooted question whether this is a legitimate form of
political participation.10
The reference to the Areopagus, a knoll on the Acropolis, may also
refer to a passage in the Book of Acts in which Saint Paul recounts the
respectful hearing he received, the openness to new ideas he observed,
and the converts he made on the Areopagus when he criticized the

8

See Siebert, Freedom of the Press at 187–90 (cited in note 5).

See Eric Nelson, “True Liberty”: Isocrates and Milton’s Areopagitica, 40 Milton Studies 201
(2001).
9

10

See Cressy, England on Edge 5, 110–26 (cited in note 3).
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Athenians for being too superstitious in their religion.11 He compares
Athens favorably to other locations where he was not so well received.
Finally, Milton’s choice of title may have been meant to signal his
belief that the issue of whether printing should be licensed must be
examined by drawing upon a broad range of sources and reasons. In
other words, Milton here might be broadcasting his intellectual debt
to Renaissance humanism even as he explores how his country can
best protect and complete the Protestant Reformation.
Superbly educated in classical rhetoric, Milton begins his “speech”
by announcing the four divisions of his argument. First, he will identify the inventors of the practice of licensing writings, “those whom
ye will be loath to own.” Second, he will discuss “what is to be thought
in general of reading, whatever sort the books be.” Third, he will contend that “this Order avails nothing to the suppressing of scandalous,
seditious, and libelous books, which were mainly intended to be suppressed.” Fourth, he will argue that the principal effect of licensing
books and pamphlets will be “the discouragement of all learning, and
the stop of truth.”12 This phrase, “the stop of truth,” is revealing. It
captures one of the most important elements of his overall argument:
his deep commitment to the notion that truth is in essence dynamic.
Truth’s dynamic essence operates “both in religious and civil wisdom.” It is important to note how explicit he is at the outset that he is
addressing civil concerns such as sedition, libel, and military effectiveness no less than religious concerns such as blasphemy, idolatry,
heresy, and Christian charity.
III. The Argument from Association
The ﬁrst part of Milton’s argument consists of a quick tour
across the centuries “to show what hath been done by ancient and
famous commonwealths against this disorder” of free writing.13
Milton reports that in Athens, “where books and wits were ever
busier than in any other part of Greece,” the magistrate “cared to take
notice” only of writings that were blasphemous and atheistical or else

11

Acts 17:16–18.

12

John Milton, Areopagitica (1644), in Hughes, ed, John Milton at 720 (cited in note 1).

Id. Calling free writing a “disorder” is Milton’s characteristically sardonic way of introducing a pamphlet designed to prove precisely the opposite.
13
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libelous. Works “tending to voluptuousness,” “denying of divine
Providence,” or expressing “Cynic impudence” were left alone.14
Like the Athenians, the Romans of the republican period punished
libel and blasphemy of their gods but left unregulated Lucretius’s
Epicurean philosophy regarding the mortality of the soul and much
“satirical sharpness.” Octavius Caesar failed to suppress a history that
extolled the part played by his rival Pompey.
During the middle ages, although “the Popes of Rome, engrossing
what they pleased of political rule into their own hands, extended their
dominion over men’s eyes,” they were “sparing in their censures.”15
Only with the fear engendered in the late fourteenth and early ﬁfteenth centuries by the writings of John Wyckliffe and Jan Huss, precursors of Luther, were individual readers excommunicated for violating the Church’s injunctions. When the Reformation broke out in
the sixteenth century, prohibitions and punishments became widespread, “until the Council of Trent and the Spanish Inquisition engendering together brought forth, or perfected, those Catalogues and
expurging Indexes, that rake through the entrails of many a good old
author, with a violation worse than any could be offered to his tomb.”
Wielders of the power to censor grew increasingly arbitrary: “Nor did
they stay in matters heretical, but any subject that was not to their
palate, they either condemned in a Prohibition, or had it straight into
the new purgatory of an index.”16
At every turn, Milton emphasizes the Roman Catholic pedigree
of the practice of licensing. His characterization of Catholic censors
is indelible:
To ﬁll up the measure of encroachment, their last invention was to ordain
that no book, pamphlet, or paper should be printed (as if St. Peter had
bequeathed them the keys of the press also out of Paradise) unless it were
approved and licensed under the hands of two or three glutton friars. . . .
Sometimes ﬁve Imprimaturs are seen together dialoguewise in the piazza
of one titlepage, complimenting and ducking each to other with their
shaven reverences, whether the author, who stands by in perplexity at the
foot of his epistle, shall to the press or to the sponge.17

14
15

Id at 720–21.
Id at 723–24.

16

Milton, Areopagitica at 724 (cited in note 12).

17

Id.
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Milton describes the Licensing Order’s requirement of an imprimatur authorizing publication as “apishly Romanizing.”
Milton ends his ﬁrst part by specifying the point of his selective
history lesson. He concedes that “though the inventors were bad, the
thing for all that may be good.” He counters that “if that thing be no
such deep invention, but obvious, and easy for any man to light on,
and yet best and wisest commonwealths through all ages and occasions have forborne to use it, and falsest seducers and oppressors of
men were ﬁrst who took it up, and to no other purpose but to obstruct
and hinder the ﬁrst approach of Reformation,” it would take an act of
alchemy “to sublimate any good use out of such an invention.”
IV. The Argument from Inseparability
The second part of Milton’s four-part argument he vaguely
labels “what is to be thought in general of reading books, whatever
sort they may be, and whether be more the beneﬁt or the harm that
thence proceeds.”18 He tries to demonstrate that the vices and dangers that would-be regulators fear from unlicensed printing are inseparable from qualities of persons and effects of their activities that
no member of his audience can possibly wish to sacriﬁce or discourage, in no small part due to shared religious understandings.
Milton builds his argument around a passage from Paul’s Epistle
to Titus: “To the pure, all things are pure.”19 Knowledge, he says,
whether of good or evil, “cannot deﬁle, nor consequently the books, if
the will and conscience be not deﬁled.”20 He notes how the Bible
preaches the virtue of temperance. “Yet God commits the managing
of so great a trust, without particular law or prescription, wholly to
the demeanor of every grown man.”21 Likewise for ideas. Rather than
relegating man “under a perpetual childhood of prescription,” God
“trusts him with the gift of reason to be his own chooser.” Indeed,
“there were but little work left for preaching, if law and compulsion
should grow so fast upon those things which heretofore were governed only by exhortation.”22

18

Id.

19

Titus 1:15.
Milton, Areopagitica at 727 (cited in note 12).

20
21

Id.

22

Id.
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This argument is rhetorically ingenious in several respects. It responds to several of the chief concerns of those who might be tempted
to support the Licensing Order. The fear that all the free thinking
in the pamphlet literature was risking God’s wrath is answered by
scriptural evidence of the value of free reading, even of bad theology,
as a preparation for choosing, if only “to discover, confute, forewarn,
or illustrate.”23 The worry about backsliding in the project of advancing the Reformation is assuaged by an argument that ascribes
a crucial role to preachers. The perception that the proliferation of
sectarian theologies that ensued after the royal licensing system was
abolished represents a form of disorder is addressed by Milton’s description of a supervening divine order. A few pages later he returns
to this point, commenting on “the high providence of God, who,
though he command us temperance, justice, continence, yet pours
out before us, even to a profuseness, all desirable things, and gives us
minds that can wander beyond all limit and satiety.”24 Why, asks
Milton, “should we then affect a rigor contrary to the manner of God
and of nature, by abridging or scanting those means, which books
freely permitted are, both to the trial of virtue and the exercise of
truth.”25
Next Milton turns to his argument from inseparability, introducing a theme he was to explore years later to great effect in Paradise
Lost:
Good and evil we know in the ﬁeld of this world grow up together almost
inseparably. . . . It was from out the rind of one apple tasted, that the
knowledge of good and evil, as two twins cleaving together, leaped forth
into the world. And perhaps this is that doom which Adam fell into of
knowing good and evil, that is to say of knowing good by evil.26

Free reading, even of false and dangerous ideas, indeed especially of
false and dangerous ideas, is integral to the experience of puriﬁcation
by means of resisting the pervasive temptations of a fallen world: “He
that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming

23

Id.

24

Milton, Areopagitica at 727 (cited in note 12).
Id.

25

26
Id at 728. For an argument that this passage represents an important moment in the
evolution of Milton’s “muscular postlapsarianism” that would eventuate in Paradise Lost, see
William Poole, Milton and the Idea of the Fall 138–40 (Cambridge, 2005).
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pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer what is
truly better, he is the true warfaring Christian.”27
Recall that one of the main arguments against leaving unregulated
the recent explosion of sectarian speculation was the fear that it was
weakening antiroyalist military prospects both by risking divine displeasure and stirring up theological divisiveness within the parliamentary coalition. Milton calls free reading a “warfaring” activity, then
develops an extended military metaphor in the effort to turn the argument around:
I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary but slinks out of the
race, where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and
heat. . . . Since therefore the knowledge and survey of vice is in this world
so necessary to the constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of error
to the conﬁrmation of truth, how can we more safely, and with less danger, scout into the regions of sin and falsity than by reading all manner of
tractates and hearing all manner of reason? And this is the beneﬁt which
may be had of books promiscuously read.28

Having asserted the inseparability of good and evil in the postlapsarian world and having explained the consequent duty of fallen
man to scout into the regions of sin and falsity, Milton identiﬁes three
types of harm that his adversaries assert might follow from such free
inquiry. The ﬁrst is “infection that may spread.”29 He responds to this
danger by suggesting it proves too much: “the Bible itself ” he notes
“oftimes relates blasphemy not nicely, it describes the carnal sense of
wicked men not unelegantly, it brings in holiest men passionately
murmuring against Providence through all the arguments of Epicurus; in other great disputes it answers dubiously and darkly to the
common reader.”30 Not only the Bible but “all the heathen writers of
greatest infection,” thinkers “with whom is bound up with the life of
human learning,” would be at risk if this concern were to justify the
licensing of books.
The second and third feared harms from evil books and pamphlets
get short shrift. One such harm is distraction, the worry that readers
might “employ our time in vain things.” The other is temptation.
27
28

Milton, Areopagitica at 728 (cited in note 12).
Id at 728–29.

29

Id at 729.

30

Id.
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Both harms Milton dismisses on the ground of inseparability: “to all
men such books are not temptations, nor vanities, but useful drugs
and materials wherewith to temper and compose effective and strong
medicines.”31
V. The Argument from Futility
Milton’s third part is the most practical, and in that way perhaps the most applicable to modern controversies about the freedom
of speech. He stresses the need for realism and common sense. He
asserts that in practice regulatory reach will far exceed the bounds of
any acknowledged justiﬁcation due to factors such as frustration, incompetence, personal antipathy, inertia, and delay. Despite such arbitrary overreach, he maintains that licensing will be “easily eluded.”32
The reason that licensing cannot tame intellectual and theological
disorder, Milton argues citing Plato as authority, is that the true
sources of order are the “unwritten, or at least unconstraining, laws of
virtuous education, religious and civil nurture.”33 Voluntary constraints that ﬂow from commitment, responsibility, self-discipline,
and loyalty are the “bonds and ligaments of the commonwealth, the
pillars and sustainers of every written statute.” He concedes that
disorder is disastrous: “Impunity and remissness, for certain, are the
bane of a commonwealth.” That is not in dispute. But practically
speaking, “here the great art lies, to discern in what the law is to bid
restraint and punishment, and in what things persuasion only is to
work.”34
“Persuasion only” has a large role in creating and preserving order, according to Milton, because to a great degree order stems from
virtue, both civic and religious. And virtue is best nurtured by trust:
“If every action, which is good or evil in man at ripe years, were to be
under pittance and prescription and compulsion, what were virtue
but a name, what praise could then be due to well-doing, what gramercy to be sober, just, or continent.”35 Order must penetrate to the
inner person. Persuasion does that better than law.

31

Milton, Areopagitica at 731 (cited in note 12).

32

Id at 733.
Id.

33
34

Id.

35

Milton, Areopagitica at 733 (cited in note 12).
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Milton returns repeatedly to his futility argument, likening licensing to “the exploit of that gallant man who thought to pound up
the crows by shutting his park gate”36 and commenting on how the
inevitable evasions “will make us all both ridiculous and weary, and
yet frustrate.”37 He notes how porous any licensing scheme is bound
to be, given that it cannot practically call in writings already in circulation and cannot prevent the initial production and distribution of
works of foreign origin.
He asks the reader to “consider the quality which ought to be in
every licenser,” and compares that to the drudgery of being “made
the perpetual reader of unchosen books and pamphlets, oftimes huge
volumes.” “[ W ]e can easily foresee,” Milton says, “what kind of licensors we are to expect hereafter, either ignorant, imperious, and
remiss, or basely pecuniary.”38
In sum, a host of practical considerations suggests that any attempt
to bring order to the thought of a nation by means of the exercise of
bureaucratic authority is destined to be futile. The objective is absurdly ambitious, the opportunities for both evasion and regulatory
abuse are ever present, and the human resources available to execute
the project are unimpressive.
VI. The Argument from Design
The fourth and ﬁnal part of Areopagitica takes up nearly half
the tract. It is more passionate, peripatetic, eloquent, and aspirational
than the preceding parts—and that is no mean trick. Milton really lets
loose. Several of his ﬁgures of speech are unforgettable. It is also true
that this is the part in which he does the most to establish his case, but
only by means of assertions and proofs that are out of the ordinary
and difﬁcult to evaluate by conventional standards.
The ﬁrst several pages of Part Four are devoted to a series of
characterizations that illustrate how much the licensing of books and
pamphlets reﬂects distrust of authors, readers, the preachers who guide
them, in effect all persons and institutions that make up the social and
religious order. Milton describes this distrust as “an undervaluing and
vilifying of the whole nation.”39 But his frame of reference is not ex36
37

Id at 730.
Id at 733.

38

Id at 734.

39

Milton, Areopagitica at 736 (cited in note 12).
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clusively the collective. At the personal level, licensing is an undervaluing that cuts deeply: “so far to distrust the judgment and the honesty of one who hath but a common repute in learning, and never yet
offended, as to not count him ﬁt to print his mind without a tutor and
examiner, lest he should drop a schism, or something of a corruption,
is the greatest displeasure and indignity to a free and knowing spirit
that can be put upon him.”40
One of the ﬁrst questions to ask about any justiﬁcation for the
freedom of speech is whether at bottom the argument rests on a claim
about collective consequences or individual entitlement. Not every
argument is easily classiﬁed in these terms; many can be read either
way. Moreover, an argument can be “individual-centered” in the
sense that it rests on a notion of how persons deserve respect or develop qua individuals, and still maintain that such respect or development is important mainly for the collective beneﬁts that members of the community generate by virtue of their individuality. In my
view, the Areopagitica is best understood as making a hybrid argument
of this sort. Milton speaks often of the Reformation, posterity, collective energy, the divine order, and the unique place in history of the
English people. He also discusses dignity, charity, the inner person,
and the centrality of choice. His repeated invocation of the religious
and civic beneﬁts of trust is an example of his integration of individual and collective units of reference.
Milton is scathing in the way he describes the inherent paternalism of licensing. “What advantage,” he asks, “is it to be a man, over
it is to be a boy at school . . . if serious and elaborate writings, as if they
were no more than the theme of a grammar-lad under his pedagogue,
must not be uttered without the cursory eyes of a temporizing and
extemporizing licenser?”41 Moreover, if revisions occur to the author
while the licensed book is in production, he must “trudge to his leavegiver”42 to get them validated. The cost is not only in personal respect
but also authorial authority, and hence impact:
And how can a man teach with authority, which is the life of teaching;
how can he be a doctor in his book as he ought to be, or else had better be
silent, whenas all he teaches, all he delivers, is but under the tuition, under

40

Id at 735.

41

Id.

42

Id.
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the correction of his patriarchal licenser to blot or alter what precisely
accords not with the hidebound humour which he calls his judgment.43

This is no way to persuade. “[E]very acute reader,” Milton complains,
will think “I hate a pupil teacher. I endure not an instructor that comes
to me under the wardship of an overseeing ﬁst.”44
An “acute reader” may distrust authors under a licensing regime,
but the regime itself distrusts the bulk of readers, whom it assumes to
be anything but acute:
Nor is it to the common people less than a reproach; for if we be so
jealous over them, as that we dare not trust them with an English pamphlet, what do we but censure them for a giddy, vicious and ungrounded
people; in such sick and weak state of faith and discretion, as to be able to
take nothing down but through the pipe of a licenser?45

The corrosive distrust is not even conﬁned to authors and readers:
[ I ]t reﬂects to the disrepute of our ministers also, of whose labors we
should hope better . . . than that after all this . . . continual preaching,
they should still be frequented with such an unprincipled, unediﬁed and
laic rabble, as that the whiff of every new pamphlet should stagger them out
of their catechism and Christian walking.46

Such an assumption of the weakness of the English people contrasts mightily with Milton’s admiring account of fortiﬁed London
during the Civil War:
Behold now this vast city: a city of refuge, the mansion house of liberty,
encompassed and surrounded with his protection; the shop of war hath not
more anvils and hammers waking, to fashion out the plates and instruments of armed justice in defense of beleaguered truth, than there be pens
and heads there, sitting by their studious lamps, musing, searching, revolving new notions and ideas wherewith to present, as with their homage and their fealty, the approaching Reformation: others as fast reading,
trying all things, assenting to the force of reason and convincement. What
could a man require more from a nation so pliant and so prone to seek after
knowledge?
Where there is much desire to learn, there of necessity will be much
arguing, much writing, many opinions, for opinion in good men is but
knowledge in the making.47
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This pivotal passage captures not only Milton’s shameless appeal to
national pride, but also three of the most striking ideas in the Areopagitica: (1) the importance of an energizing environment to the quest
for knowledge, (2) the dynamic character of truth and understanding, and (3) the order that can subsist in the collective project of persons trying to think independently about “the solidest and sublimest
points of controversy and new invention.”48
In intellectual and spiritual matters, for all his years of solitary
study, for all the focus on individual choice and responsibility in his
various prose works and later epic poetry, Milton is an environmentalist in the sense that he thinks the surrounding atmosphere, the
collective energy of an age and place, really matters. This is one reason why he was less troubled by radical sectarian thinking about matters divine than were most of his compatriots. Ideas beyond the pale,
emanating from strange creatures, contribute to the collective quest,
even if only by functioning as “dust and cinders” which “serve to
polish and brighten the armory of Truth.”49 In that way, even the wild
nostrums of the sectaries can be part of “knowledge in the making.”50
“Knowledge in the making” is a double entendre. It refers both to a
quest destined never to be completed till “the end of mortal things,”51
and to the fact that understanding and believing are as much a
function of how as of what. Both meanings speak of dynamism. Regarding the ﬁrst, Milton says: “The light which we have gained was
given us, not to be ever staring on, but by it to discover onward things
more remote from our knowledge.”52 Milton would be nobody’s
favorite in a humility contest. That said, it is notable how much his
argument depends on his view of the limits of human understanding:
“he who thinks we are to pitch our tent here, and have attained the
utmost prospect of reformation that the mortal glass wherein we
contemplate can show us, till we come to beatiﬁc vision, that man by
this very opinion declares that he is yet far short of truth.”53
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The perpetual dynamism of truth suggests the difﬁculty of domesticating it for the purpose of regulation: “Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopolized and traded in by tickets
and statutes and standards. We must not think to make a staple commodity of all the knowledge in the land, to mark and license it like
our broadcloth and our woolpacks.”54 Precisely because truth is “our
richest merchandise,”55 it would be self-defeating to “set an oligarchy of twenty engrossers over it, to bring a famine upon our minds
again, when we shall know nothing but what is measured to us by
their bushel.”56
A reader of Milton might wonder how his economic metaphor
here compares to a later economic metaphor introduced by Justice
Holmes, the “marketplace of ideas,” which has come to play a large
and persistent role in modern First Amendment analysis.57 Blair
Hoxby, an important Milton scholar, has shown how the struggle for
liberty of the press in the seventeenth century was part of a larger
controversy over free trade, and that Milton wrote Areopagitica in
part at the behest of journeymen printers aggrieved by crown, and
later parliamentary, patents restricting proﬁtable printing to a privileged few master printers.58 Recall also that Milton’s father, with
whom he was close, was an enterprising businessman who raised his
son in the heart of the City of London, then and now the concentrated ﬁnancial district of the greater metropolis. So is Milton contending for the freedom to print on the analogy to the freedom to buy
and sell?
Some of his arguments relating to inevitable regulatory inefﬁciency, incompetence, corruption, and perverse consequences might
suggest as much, but there is a big difference between how Milton
and Holmes deploy their economic metaphors. Holmes’s point arguably, and the point of later exponents of the marketplace metaphor
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more explicitly, is that speech should be left free to be governed by
market forces because ideas do not warrant special treatment: they
embody arbitrary preferences derived from adventitious experiences
and thus can be likened to commodities.59 Persons aggrieved by what
they take to be excessive regulation of transactions regarding commodities therefore should be concerned also about excessive regulation of speakers. Milton’s point is the opposite: because speech is
uniquely important (“our richest merchandise”), it should not be
subject to the same types of regulation, including licensing, that in
his day (more than a century before Adam Smith) comprehensively
governed the production and sale of commodities.
The second meaning of the double entendre “knowledge in the
making” is that truth is only valuable if it is earned and held in the
right way:
[O]ur faith and knowledge thrives by exercise, as well as our limbs and
complexion. Truth is compared in Scripture to a streaming fountain; if
her waters ﬂow not in a perpetual progression, they sicken into a muddy
pool of conformity and tradition. A man may be a heretic in the truth; and
if he believe things only because his pastor says so, or the Assembly so
determines, without knowing other reason, though his belief be true, yet
the very truth he holds becomes his heresy.60

The concept of “perpetual progression” is central to Milton’s argument. Not only in the nation as a whole but within each individual
must there be a perpetual progression of inquiry. Milton makes that
clear with his concept of a “heretic in the truth.”
With the assistance of licensing, heresy in the truth can occur
“among the clergy themselves.” An “easily inclinable” cleric ensconced in “a warm beneﬁce” may be able to fulﬁll his “weekly charge
of sermoning” with small effort, “forming and transforming, joining
and disjoining” the “gatherings and savings of a sober graduateship”
supplemented by additional cribs such as published breviaries and
synopses.61 However, “if his back door be not secured by the rigid
licenser, but that a bold book may now and then issue forth and give
the assault to some of his old collections in their trenches, it will

59

See Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Natural Law, 32 Harv L Rev 40, 41 (1918).

60

Milton, Areopagitica at 739 (cited in note 12).
Id at 740.

61

290

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2017

concern him then to set good guards and sentinels about his received
opinions.”62 Our comfortable clergyman may not be frightened into a
perpetual progression of ceaseless inquiry, but at least he will need to
make a start in the direction of active understanding in order to pass
muster with his ﬂock.
The third of Milton’s key claims that are embedded in his extended image of embattled, energetic, inquisitive London relates to
the concern about order that contributed to Parliament’s decision
to reinstitute licensing. To turn free thinkers into soldiers of the
Reformation manning the city’s defenses with their pens and lamps
is to transmute perceived anarchy into order and perceived military
weakness into strength. Later he turns the argument of his adversaries around a second time, upping the religious stakes to assert a
divine order that is being served by the wide-ranging theological
speculation:
Under these fantastic terrors of sect and schism, we wrong the earnest
and zealous thirst after knowledge and understanding which God hath
stirred up in this city. What some lament of, we rather should rejoice of,
should rather praise this pious forwardness among men, to reassume the
ill-deputed care of their religion into their own hands again.63

Defenders of licensing make too much of the proliferation of new
ideas and distinctive sects, he argues: “They fret, and out of their own
weakness are in agony, lest these divisions and subdivisions will undo
us. . . . Fool! He sees not the ﬁrm root, out of which we all grow,
though into branches.”64
Probably Milton’s most effective response to the fear of disorder
is his recounting an Egyptian myth regarding Isis and Osiris, derived
from Plutarch’s Lives and adapted to appeal to the religious sensibilities of his audience:
Truth indeed came once into the world with her divine Master, and
was a perfect shape most glorious to look on: but when he ascended, and his
Apostles after him were laid asleep, then straight arose a wicked race of
deceivers, who . . . took the virgin Truth, hewed her lovely form into a
thousand pieces, and scattered them to the four winds. From that time ever
since, the sad friends of Truth, such as durst appear, imitating the careful
search that Isis made for the mangled body of Osiris, went up and down
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gathering up limb by limb, still as they could ﬁnd them. We have not yet
found them all, Lords and Commons, nor ever shall do, till her Master’s
second coming; he shall bring together every joint and member, and shall
mould them into an immortal feature of loveliness and perfection.65

The brilliance of this move lies not so much in its religious resonance generally but in its description of fallen men, in the form of
bold inquirers like the sectaries, laboriously and perpetually doing
God’s work by piecing together the scattered fragments of a once
perfect truth that cannot be fully reassembled “in mortal time” but
which needs to be sought as a precondition for the Second Coming.66
In other words, free thinking is not a destructive activity that breaks
apart the understandings that hold a community together but rather
a constructive activity that paves the way for the true order of redemption through divine grace. Those threatening radicals are actually builders.
Never one to let pass the opportunity to turn an adversary’s argument around, Milton accuses the licensers themselves of sowing
the seeds of disorder: “They are the troublers, they are the dividers of
unity, who neglect and permit not others to unite those dissevered
pieces which are yet wanting to the body of truth.” Failing to “recover
any enthralled piece of truth out of the grip of custom” retards the
project of reassembly. It keeps “truth separated from truth, which is
the ﬁercest rent and disunion of all.”67 In contrast, Milton’s unity
consists of “still searching what we know not by what we know, still
closing up truth to truth as we ﬁnd it. . . . not the forced and outward
union of cold, and neutral, and inwardly divided minds.”68
This terse description of what true order is not, contained in less
than a sentence, might be the most pregnant passage in the entire
Areopagitica. In it Milton weaves together no fewer than ﬁve of the
ﬁgurative dichotomies that drive his overall argument: (1) forced vs.
free (law vs. persuasion, authority vs. reason); (2) outward vs. inward
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(Catholic vs. Protestant, ritual vs. conscience); (3) cold vs. warm
(frozen vs. ﬂuid, inert vs. energetic, static vs. dynamic); (4) neutral vs.
committed (passive vs. active, obedient vs. independent); and (5) divided vs. united (partial vs. whole).
Milton cares as much about order as he does about virtue, indeed he ﬁnds each integral to the other, as can be seen by tracing
how these ﬁve dichotomies serve his argument in tandem. More
remains to be said to capture the full measure of his understanding
of virtue and order, but a key point to make at this stage is that Milton’s argument for free printing has little in common with later arguments that treat the freedoms of thought and speech as instances
of a general right to be free of unnecessary restraint or tutelage or a
general right to express or exercise one’s individuality. Milton is no
libertarian, and only in the broadest sense of the term verging on the
meaningless can he be labeled a liberal. Neither is he a pluralist. And
he certainly is not a moral skeptic, nor much of an epistemic one.
Regarding the latter, his belief that God’s method is to “deal out by
degrees his beam, so as our earthly eyes may best sustain it”69 and his
admonition not to “pitch our tent here”70 marry the limits of human
understanding to the possibility of epistemic progress. The Areopagitica is an argument from design for free printing as a means to the
end of serving a demanding God, albeit a God whose demands center on individual choice, effort, curiosity, and discipline.
An argument from design is bounded in its coverage by its rationale, as are arguments of other sorts such as those from necessity,
experience, commitment, or predicted consequences. If certain activities do not perform a function in the design, they are not covered
by the argument, unless there exists a strategic reason to cover them
in order to protect other activities that do serve such a function.
Milton announces at the end of the tract that his thirty-plus pages of
riveting, imaginative, overﬂowing, visionary argumentation apply
only to differences within bounds, not disagreement over basics. His
adversaries “stumble and are impatient at the least dividing of one
visible congregation from another, though it be not in fundamentals.” In calling for free printing, Milton reassures his reader that
“neighboring differences, or rather indifferences, are what I speak of,
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whether in some point of doctrine or of discipline, which though they
be many, yet need not interrupt the unity of spirit.”71
To the chagrin of his modern admirers, Milton gives examples of
ways of thinking that lie beyond the bounds of his unity of spirit, and
thus do not serve the theological/moral/political order his proposed
regime is meant to enable. “I mean not tolerated popery,” he says,
“and open superstition, which as it extirpates all religions and civil
supremacies, so itself should be extirpate.” He goes on to exclude
“that also which is impious or evil absolutely either against faith or
manners.” “[N]o law can possibly permit” such writings, Milton says,
“that intends not to unlaw itself.”72 His argument, he makes clear, is
not about toleration as a ﬁrst principle or free-standing individual
right. Rather, it is about the understanding that can result from vigorous contestation among members of a faith community who “all
cannot be of one mind—as who looks they should be?” 73 and who are
regrettably prone to generate “subdichotomies of petty schisms,”74
but who nonetheless share sufﬁcient common ground as to be eligible to experience the Pauline “unity of spirit”75 that is the essence of
Christian Liberty.
In short, Milton’s theology, and the political theory he derives
therefrom, is informed by how much he and his compatriots need
continually to learn—and also how much they stand to gain by trying
to learn—even as ultimate knowledge is beyond the reach of fallen
man. Inquiry, he maintains, is the key to God’s order. Such inquiry
requires “the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according
to conscience.”76 It also requires spiritual qualities that some wouldbe speakers and writers do not possess.
VII. Implications beyond Licensing
Perhaps the most basic interpretative question presented by
the Areopagitica is whether the tract has anything to say about efforts
to regulate speech by means other than licensing. When Milton
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speciﬁes the targets of his criticism, usually he chooses terms that
suggest he is talking only about a comprehensive requirement that
all writings be submitted to an administrative censor before publication. For example, the paternalism he objects to consists of distrust,
supplication, certiﬁcation, and loss of control over timing that characterizes administrative censorship to a much greater degree than
other forms of regulation. An author who is prosecuted after publication, or enjoined, or made to pay civil damages for causing personal
injury with his words, does not suffer the indignity of being made to
“trudge to his leave-giver.”77 Such an author does not have his serious
work, the product of “the hardest labor in the deep mines of knowledge,”78 judged by “the cursory eyes of temporizing or extemporizing
licenser.”79 His regulators do not “keep a narrow bridge of licensing
where the challenger should pass.”80 His audiences are not considered to be “in such a sick and weak state of faith and discretion, as to
be able to take nothing down but through the pipe of a licenser.”81
Moreover, Milton’s repeated arguments from futility, among his
most powerful to a modern reader, have greater purchase as applied
to licensing compared to other forms of regulation. Regulation by
means of criminal punishment, tort damages, or injunction is designed to be selective. The initiative lies with the regulators. The need
for prioritization lowers the bar for measuring efﬁcacy. The comprehensiveness of a licensing regime makes it not only intrusive, expensive, and unwieldy, but also destined to suffer endemic evasions.
Still another reason to read Areopagitica as tailored to the speciﬁc
characteristics of licensing is the emphasis Milton places on the disputational environment. Like most early proponents of free speech,
he operates at the level of the society as a whole. He seeks a highly
energized, dynamic, fearless collective quest for understanding. Think
of the perpetually ﬂowing fountain,82 the army of “true warfaring”
Christians scouting “into the regions of sin and falsity” by means
of “books promiscuously read,”83 the “much writing, much arguing,
77
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many opinions” of “knowledge in the making.”84 All regulation of
speech threatens to slow down and take the edge off of these energizing activities, but especially licensing with its comprehensive reach,
placement of the burden of inertia, built-in delays, distrust, predictable administrative rigidity and mediocrity, and escalating severity
born of futility.
On the other hand, there are some important speciﬁc features of
Milton’s argument, features he emphasizes, that surely carry over to
the regulation of speech by means other than licensing. Among the
most important is the positive value he sees in confronting evil and
dangerous ideas. By the logic of his argument, the search for understanding would be much worse off were those ideas not to be
available as foils and provocations and were authors and readers not
seasoned by the experience of engaging them. It is true that licensing
more than other means of regulation threatens to suppress ideas to
the point of making them unavailable, but the difference is only in
degree. One objective of criminal sanctions is to deter future transgressions. There is every reason to believe that a regime that eschews
licensing but systematically punishes authors after publication for
lines crossed or harms done will on that account lose much of the
writing that Milton values, both because some authors will steer far
wide of the danger zone of prosecution and many who don’t and are
prosecuted will alter their ways going forward. Although his concern
for the discursive environment might suggest that Milton should be
especially hostile to licensing, his emphasis on the disputational energy level of the society should also make him more sensitive than
most advocates of free speech to the chilling effects of criminal and
civil liability postpublication.
Furthermore, Milton claims that “the best and surest suppressing” is not subsequent punishment but rather the confuting of falsehood.85 He says there “would be little work left for preaching if law
and compulsion should grow so fast upon those things which heretofore were governed only by exhortation.”86 These arguments from
divine design apply to any form of legal regulation of printing.
Milton’s arguments from the value of confronting falsehood, from
the dynamic nature of truth and the consequent value of an ener84
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gizing environment of collective inquiry, from the comparative efﬁcacy of controlling evil ideas by means of refutation, and from the
role in the divine plan of free choosing by fallen man all have application not only to licensing but also to other means of regulating
writing. In that respect, his arguments cannot be cabined in the narrow (in modern times) domain of comprehensive administrative licensing, even as, like a good lawyer, Milton in Areopagitica takes care
to shape his presentation to the case at hand, leaving more wideranging implications to be teased out by his readers.
VIII. Asymmetric Treatment of Consequences
Milton makes a variety of strong claims regarding how unlicensed printing can advance both English republicanism and the
“reforming of Reformation itself”87 by virtue of how readers are enlightened, challenged, tempted, corrected, energized, and inspired
by the bold, conscientious writing that is the subject of the tract. His
argument depends on the proposition that ideas can be powerful,
capable of penetrating to the inner person and altering the reader’s
understanding, character, and motivation to act. However, the causal
link that Milton perceives between writer and reader seems to be
stronger when he is waxing eloquent about the potential good effects
of his proposed regime for republicanism and religion than when
he is minimizing the harms of infection, temptation, and distraction
that can follow from free printing. In this regard, is the argument
of Areopagitica internally inconsistent? If ideas have the power to
“spring up armed men,”88 why should we assume that those men will
be disproportionately soldiers of an enlightened rather than misguided religious or political order—or no order at all?
There can be no need to demonstrate how numerous, various,
profound, and enduring are the salutary effects upon readers that
Milton believes will ensue from trusting authors with “the liberty to
know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience.”89 The
fourth and ﬁnal part of the Areopagitica—the longest and most eloquent part—is a veritable catalog of such posited good effects. The
key question, so far as Milton’s consistency is concerned, is why he
87
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does not deploy his extraordinary gift for imaginative description to
impress upon the reader the multifarious ways that false teachers, left
unregulated, can harm gullible readers and vulnerable third parties.
His discussion of “infection” does not deny or minimize the phenomenon but neither does he elaborate upon the scope or severity of
the danger. Rather, Milton argues that any attempt to root out infection will threaten “the fall of learning and of all ability in disputation.”90 The harms of temptation and distraction (“vain things”) are
double-edged, he asserts, in that they present opportunities for selfcontrol. These are clever responses, not without some validity, but
they lead one to wonder whether Milton doubts the power of bad
ideas, at least those generated by persons arguing freely according to
conscience, to spread and thereby cause serious harm.
His belief in divine providence might suggest as much. Shortly
after he observes that Truth “needs no policies, nor stratagems, nor
licensings to make her victorious,”91 Milton explains that when false
teachers are “busiest in seducing” God then “raises to his own work
men of rare abilities” to set things right. However, what is most notable about this passage is that under the providential dispensation
that Milton embraces, human agency plays an important role, hence
the saving work of the “men of rare abilities” and the danger posed by
ill-conceived laws like the Licensing Order of 1643.92 Even if the
ultimate triumph of good over evil is preordained under “the Angels’
ministry at the end of mortal things,”93 it is imperative that fallen man
“ordain wisely as in this world of evil, in the midst whereof God hath
placed us unavoidably.”94 In this respect, the potency and resilience
of bad ideas, as well as their susceptibility to human containment by
noncoercive means, is something that Milton needs to consider. Faith
in divine providence does not free him from this obligation. But his
belief in the intervention of divine providence in the present, as “the
state of man now is,”95 informs his assessment of the net damage that
evil ideas can cause. And that intervention, as he understands it, is to
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make divine Truth “strong, next to the Almighty” when apprehended
by fallen mortals reading and arguing with the requisite “unity of
spirit.”96 So strong, it seems, that false teachings, even when widely
disseminated in the absence of licensing, are no match.
The point is that Milton’s unbalanced treatment of the consequences of free printing, his disproportionate attention to the good
effects, derives from his transcendent faith in the power of good ideas,
a faith which is the product of his particular theological commitments. Areopagitica disappoints the modern reader with its inattention to the risks and costs of unlicensed printing, but that is no mark
against Milton because the logic of his argument does not depend on
the claim that evil ideas will not achieve wide dissemination and
considerable impact in the absence of regulation. Even if many bad
consequences were to occur as a result of unlicensed printing, he
would consider the cost to be acceptable. His twin causes of republicanism and Reformation, both of which he views as dependent in
an elemental way on free inquiry and communication, would take
priority.
In this view, his case for free inquiry and critical argumentation
“according to conscience,”97 if not necessarily for all manner of free
expression, does not turn on how much harm it causes. However
much that harm is, it is dwarfed by the fundamental, generative,
perpetually-renewing good of “knowledge in the making.”98
IX. Enduring Ideas
One way to read Milton is with an eye to his possible impact
on subsequent thought about the freedom of speech. His argument
in Areopagitica is notable for its reliance on the high value of free
writing rather than doubt about the capacity of ideas to cause harm;
its recognition that not every form or act of writing embodies that
high value; its thesis that exposure to bad ideas can lead to a deeper
understanding of and stronger commitment to good ideas; its claim
that “confuting is the best and surest suppressing”;99 its derivation
of freedoms from duties; its focus on audience interests rather than
96
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those of speakers; its synthesis of dynamic, contingent phenomena
and perdurable, foundational commitments; its attention to individual character and communal spirit, and more generally its view of
individual freedom as instrumental to collective achievement; and its
premise that freedom of (disciplined) thought is the transcendent
value. Each of these ideas has been appropriated and reﬁned by one
or another subsequent thinker of note. All ﬁgure prominently in the
free speech tradition. That said, I consider the following four ideas
to constitute the core of the Areopagitica’s accomplishment going
forward.
a. the deracination of heresy
Milton’s most important contribution to the modern understanding of the freedom of speech is the way his argument in Areopagitica
lays the groundwork for the eventual discrediting of the concept of
heresy, an idea that historically has played a prominent, mischievous
role in both religious and civil discourse. Some persons are comfortable with belief systems that treat all propositions claiming truth
value as contingent and perspectival, but many persons—probably
most—are not. There is a powerful impulse to treat at least some ideas
as constitutive of a regime or a faith, such that denials of their truth are
seen as subversive and disqualifying for membership in the community. Milton demonstrates that one can hold certain ideas to be fundamental and essential yet still need to hear them challenged. He
achieves this with four different but related arguments.
First, he asserts over and over again how important it is not simply to hold true ideas but to hold them in the correct way. Preserving
a “fugitive and cloistered virtue” will not do.100 To understand truth
and virtue fully, one must “scout into the regions of sin and falsity.”101
Doing so helps the holder of a truth “to discover, to confute, to
forewarn, and to illustrate.”102 A person who takes his beliefs on faith
or authority can be “a heretic in the truth” says Milton, even when his
received opinions are in fact true: “if he believes things only because
his pastor says so, or the Assembly so determines, without knowing
other reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds
100
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becomes his heresy.”103 Notice that in this key passage he does not
renounce the concept of heresy but rather redeﬁnes it. In his view, the
transgression that separates a person from the community is not believing a proposition that is forbidden but rather coming to and retaining a belief by means of a forbidden process of unthinking deference to authority or custom.104
Milton was by no means the ﬁrst important thinker to emphasize
the “how” over the “what” in matters of fundamental belief. The
distinguished Milton scholar Nigel Smith traces this priority to the
concept of proairesis—the practice of informed, reasoned choice—in
ancient Greek philosophy. The contrary privileging of “what” over
“how” derives, he explains, from the “Augustinian understanding
of heresy as that which is forbidden and to be expunged from believers, making them if need be the object of persecution.” According
to Smith, the Areopagitica makes “a forceful plea” for embracing the
Greek rather than Augustinian ideal.105 One might even speculate
that Milton’s choice of title for his tract may have had something to
do with his admiration for the Greek ideal of proairesis.106
Second, “in the ﬁeld of this world” good and evil are not as easily separated as the traditional conception of heresy assumes. They
“grow up together almost inseparably.” The knowledge of good is
“involved and interwoven with the knowledge of evil, and in so many
cunning resemblances is hardly to be discerned.”107 Attempting to
purge books of their heretical ideas would result in “the fall of learning.” False appearances and precipitant judgment compound the
cost of trying to eradicate ideas that are considered to be heretical in
themselves.
Third, his critique of excessive attention to form at the expense of
spirit and character, manifested throughout Areopagitica in imagery
103
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exalting the inner over the outer, the essential over the superﬁcial, helps
to explain why the conventional understanding of heresy is a regulatory concept that cannot serve a worthy end. Punishment for heresy
in the traditional sense seeks only a false order—“the forced and outward union of cold and neutral and inwardly divided minds”108—and
thereby thwarts the construction of a true kind of order based on trust,
commitment, and mutual responsibility. Because the regulation of
printing typically is imbued with imprecision and futility, the act of
licensing has the character of a formal gesture, a regulatory show.
Central to Milton’s thought in several domains—religion, poetry,
politics, education, marriage—is his objection to reliance on forms as
a substitute for having to choose wisely. Those who would regulate
writings judge them superﬁcially for several reasons, but important
among them is the fact that most of the time the censorship of ideas is
not really meant to be a discriminating gesture. It is intended rather
to be a formal discharge of regulatory responsibility or a public afﬁrmation of conventional forms of authority and thought. No justiﬁcation for regulating speech embodies this formalism so much as the
claim that certain beliefs as such may not be entertained no matter
how worthy is the process by which the believer has come to hold
them.
Fourth, Milton is able to discredit the conventional understanding
of heresy even while basing his argument on the need to facilitate a
supremely important and ambitious truth-seeking process that assumes the existence of genuine moral and religious knowledge. He
does this by embracing one kind of skepticism but not another. He
is not the least bit skeptical about the existence of enduring truths,
political as well as divine, that are accessible to human inquiry. But he
is impressed by how difﬁcult and error-ridden is the process by which
fallible human beings in a fallen world go about trying to discover and
live those truths. In such a world of partial understanding, the attempt
to classify beliefs in themselves as grounds for punishment is misconceived. Persons who err while undertaking a sincere effort to understand in the light of scripture, reason, and spirit working together
deserve both charity and membership in the community of inquirers.
Milton makes strong, controversial claims about the nature of truth
and the best way to attain meaningful understanding. Many of his
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particular prescriptions are a product of his unique situation and do
not translate well to other times and places. But in demonstrating how
one can believe in genuine community-deﬁning truths and still have
no use for the traditional conception of heresy, Milton advances the
case for toleration immeasurably.109 As his treatment of Catholic idolatry and unspeciﬁed non-Catholic practices that are “evil absolutely”
indicates, in theory Milton’s analysis could justify punishment for
excessive passivity and conformity in the realm of belief or, at the
other end of the spectrum, impulsive, fanciful, provocative religious
assertion that ﬂouts the Protestant duty of earnest, informed, patient,
disciplined, independent spiritual inquiry. But given the Pauline imperative of charity that he invokes (“provided ﬁrst that all charitable
and compassionate means be used to regain the weak and the misled”)110 and the practical difﬁculty of judging transgressions of
method and spirit rather than content, Milton’s redeﬁnition of heresy
implies its demise as an operational matter, his stated exclusions for
popery and impiety notwithstanding.
Many of the arguments that he advances to undercut the claim that
the traditional conception of heresy is a deﬁning feature of a faith
community also have purchase in pluralistic regimes, such as modern Western democracies. For his insistence that there are better
and worse ways of holding beliefs and positive value to confronting
suspect, even offensive and dangerous, ideas—“knowing good by
evil”111—does much to justify what may be the essential commitment
in any broad-based ethic of toleration: the assumption that the beneﬁts of free inquiry and respect for sincere belief are such important
goods that the harms they can cause must be endured, except in rare,
narrowly deﬁned circumstances. Milton demonstrates how even persons who are committed to certain beliefs, whether on grounds of
knowledge or experience or faith or attachment or identity, have good
reasons to learn, consider, and respond to what others are thinking.
Even if there are severe limits to human understanding and (contrary
to Milton’s view) no transcendent sources of value and duty, what he
observes about the individual and collective processes of inquiry and
judgment provides reasons to attend to the thought of others, if only
109
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for purposes of scavenging and testing. One need not exalt truthseeking in the way that Milton does to acknowledge that in a pluralistic regime designed to govern a theologically and philosophically
diverse population, the ways that persons and groups develop and
defend their conﬂicting understandings can matter. Milton’s memorable accounts of deceiving appearances, incremental enlightenment,
energizing effects, layers of understanding, overreaction to small differences, and the dynamic character of belief can be appropriated in
service of the proposition that free speech is an activity of particular
importance in such regimes.
The greatest achievement of modern First Amendment law is its
hard-won abolition of the concepts of heresy and its cousin sedition.
Today, would-be regulators of speech have to demonstrate the risk
of material harm. As a matter of principle, proving error or incompatibility with fundamental tenets is never enough. From a historical
perspective, that is a remarkable development, and Milton deserves
some of the credit.
b. free speech environmentalism
Milton’s argument for free printing is distinctive even among
audience-centered arguments in the degree to which it emphasizes
the impact of regulation on the overall environment of public disputation. He cares fervently that what he takes to be the relevant community maintain a vibrant discursive spirit bursting with inquisitive
energy. He argues that licensing saps that spirit by virtue of the disrespect to authors and audiences it embodies, the delays and opportunities for corruption and incompetent exercise of authority it creates, and the false order it imposes. One might say that he cares about
what modern doctrine labels the “chilling effect.” This is true and
important, and something contemporary First Amendment thinkers
can build on without having to share his religious premises. Many
of Milton’s multifarious, imaginative arguments relating to intellectual independence pitted against conventional understanding have
a general thrust. They address ways that unsettling ideas of various
sorts can germinate, penetrate defenses, sustain themselves, and proliferate, as well as how such salutary ferment can be threatened by
predictable dynamics of regulatory rigidity and abuse.
One might even think that Milton’s emphasis in this respect is a
precursor of the modern Court’s reigning doctrinal shibboleth, ﬁrst
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articulated in New York Times v Sullivan, “that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”112 The Justices have
invoked this ideal in a range of cases, both to expand the scope of
activities considered to be within the domain of First Amendment
coverage and to disallow various forms of regulation designed to make
public debate more balanced, civil, transparent, or factually accurate.
Across a broad spectrum of problems, “more speech is always better” has become the clinching argument in First Amendment adjudication.113
Milton, however, issues no such call for unbounded verbal insouciance. He has nothing to say about the value of speech for its own
sake or as a means of letting off steam or being provocative in order
to irritate, intimidate, or fuel resentment. He does not address the
role that speech plays in the competition for power and inﬂuence.
Learning, not self-expression, is what he takes to be the beneﬁt of free
printing. Milton is all about discipline and duty. He does not claim
about all speech that “more is always better,” rather that more informed, pious, even if bold and unsettling inquiry is always better.
Harms caused by “uninhibited” speakers not engaged in such inquiry
are beyond the scope of his argument.
Although Milton does not believe that more speech is always better
among ill-motivated or impious speakers, he does claim that more
exposure to sin and falsehood can be highly beneﬁcial to the serious
thinkers he is most concerned about, and not only because such exposure requires them as individuals to exercise the discipline and
commitment to resist temptation and refute specious arguments. He
regards the vanquishing of sin and falsity as a collective project, symbolized by his vision of England as the “mansion house of liberty”114
inhabited by armies of energetic, bold thinkers with their pens and
lamps continually engaged in “the reforming of Reformation itself.”115
He maintains that the acquisition and active maintenance of knowledge depends on both courageous individuals and a supportive environment, and he argues that licensing not only thwarts the former
but enervates the latter.
112
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Milton’s “free speech environmentalism” can be seen as a contribution that is not conﬁned to the way it serves his own uncommonly
ambitious argument. A regime that understands the principle of
freedom of speech to have a different rationale, a wider scope, and less
exalted objectives than what he urges nevertheless can draw on his
environmentalism. The discursive environment can be important in
a speaker-centered view of the freedom of speech as well as in Milton’s duty-driven, audience-centered understanding. Even autonomybased accounts of the freedom of speech sometimes stress the central role of the surrounding environment in facilitating the speaker’s
development, dignity, and choice.116 Regarding the indiscriminate
“more is always better” presumption, a supportive environment, especially one that energizes its participants, can be a signiﬁcant factor
in stimulating speech designed to advance the narrow objectives of
the speaker no less than the speech of disciplined inquiry in the service
of the common good or the divine plan.
His claim that true freedom requires a spirit of boldness in the air
that can be dissipated by distrustful, prescriptive regulatory ordering
might be considered to apply across a wide range of activities. Even
though different arguments from those that Milton offers are needed
to establish that communicative self-assertion as such is an activity
worthy of special regard in its own right,117 such self-assertion could
have instrumental value by virtue of its contribution to the overall
energy level that he prizes. In this way, his insights regarding what
is needed for valuable freedoms to ﬂourish might help to justify a far
broader understanding of the freedom of speech than Milton himself
ever would have embraced.
Actually, he was relatively capacious among the free speech advocates of his day in the breadth of the principle he defended. Although he did not extend his principle of protection to “popery,”
“open superstition,” or that which is “evil absolutely,”118 neither did
most of his peers.119 Where Milton’s notion of coverage was broad for
116
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its time was in the instrumental value he found in the speech of the
radical sectaries, whose ideas were viewed by most observers as blasphemous and irresponsible. He respected the sectaries not out of
compassion or because their humanity required it. Rather, he thought
their strange ideas might have something to contribute to his own
understanding and that of others, and not only by serving as a foil. For
“if it comes to prohibiting, there is not aught more likely to be prohibited than truth itself, whose ﬁrst appearances to our eyes, bleared
and dimmed with prejudice and custom, is more unsightly and implausible than many errors, even as the person is of many a great man
slight and contemptuous to see to.”120 Furthermore, apart from the
possibility that genuine truths might be lurking in their provocative
ideas, Milton valued the radical sectaries for their example of intellectual independence and courage, as well as their contribution to collective energy.
So why didn’t he apply such reasoning to the speech of Catholics?
This question is worth an article in its own right, but one might begin by noting that he denied even the possibility that genuine truths
might be lurking in Catholic theology. God might “deal out by
degrees his beam”121 but the falsity of Catholicism was, to Milton’s
mind, a divine judgment already dealt out. Even if true, however,
there remains the objection that an argument urging readers to “scout
into the regions of sin and falsity”122 so as to facilitate “knowing good
by evil”123 would seem to be served by the availability of Catholic
writings.124 If Milton’s exclusion of Catholicism can be defended at all
within the terms of his overall argument, his concern for free speech
environmentalism offers the best prospect. Catholic ecclesiastic hierarchy, seductive ritual, and systematic persecution of heretics constituted, in his view, the supreme threat to sustaining an environment
of intellectual independence and inquisitive energy. In no way did
he consider Catholic theology and practice to be a possible source of
Roger Williams, and the Limits of Toleration, in Sharon Achinstein and Elizabeth Sauer, eds,
Milton and Toleration 72–85 (Oxford, 2007). See generally Norah Carlin, Toleration for
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those invaluable public goods.125 In that regard, the speech of the
sectaries was very different.
c. the centre cannot hold
Milton’s consistent attention to the practical realities of speech
regulation is one of his important legacies. In his case, astonishing
creativity was not a substitute for, but rather a product of, shrewd
observation and demanding appraisal. He was a close student and
admirer of Machiavelli, hence his emphasis on political energy. The
Areopagitica is couched in the argot of political realism: “to sequester
out of the world in Atlantic and Utopian polities which can never be
drawn into use will not mend our condition,” Milton states. Instead,
he urges his readers to “ordain wisely . . . in this world of evil.”126 In
Book VIII of Paradise Lost, the angel Raphael counsels Adam: “be
lowly wise. . . . Dream not of other worlds.”127
The lowly wisdom of Areopagitica is considerable. Milton insists,
for example, that the policy of licensing cannot be assessed without
taking into account the capacities, working conditions, loyalties, and
temperaments of the persons who will serve as licensers. In a way, he
anticipates the modern attention to institutional incentives as a key
factor in First Amendment analysis. Still another practical feature of
licensing he identiﬁes is how responsibility for the censorial decision
is often divided and accountability thereby evaded. His image of “ﬁve
Imprimaturs . . . seen together dialoguewise in the piazza of one
titlepage, complimenting and ducking each to other”128 captures this
phenomenon—a problem, we might believe, that also plagues the
modern administrative state.
In recounting the history of licensing, he observes that the authority to regulate speech was routinely abused. Licensers did not “stay
in matters heretical” but rather asserted control over “any subject that
was not to their palate.”129 Much of modern free speech doctrine is
125
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founded upon generalized distrust of regulatory motives, even as
adjudication of such motives in individual cases is deemed impractical
for the most part. In the Areopagitica Milton mercilessly harnesses his
formidable satiric talent to urge such distrust.
Milton’s most interesting practical argument is an observation about
the cumulative effect of several of his discrete points regarding corruption, futility, unintended consequences, mediocrity, frustration,
and the true sources of order. In essence, he argues that, as a practical
matter, there can be no such thing as a measured, disciplined, rational
censorship. Inevitably, licensing “will prove the most unlicensed book
itself.”130 The choice, he maintains, is between the regime of free
printing that he advocates and the severe Counter-Reformation “model
of Trent and Seville.”131 There is no middle ground.
Even if in modern times the choice is not so stark, Milton makes a
lasting contribution by deploying piercing ridicule to discredit the
notion of speech regulation ever being conducted with a light touch.
His compelling images of administrative arrogance, corruption, and
mindless rigidity should always be part of the equation as each new
threat or outrage generates well-meaning proposals for limited, carefully conﬁned restrictions on speech.
d. the claims of posterity
Another enduring contribution of Milton’s is his insistence that
the value of free thinking and writing be assessed with due regard for
its possible long-range beneﬁts. In discussing the suppression of ideas,
he laments that “revolutions of ages do not oft recover the loss of a
rejected truth, for the want of which whole nations fare the worse.”132
Necessarily, the net effects of free thinking over time must be highly
speculative. Because truth is dynamic and experiential, something to
be lived rather than possessed, its long-term beneﬁts cannot be computed objectively or precisely. For Milton, that is not a sufﬁcient reason to ignore or discount them. Despite his keen interest in the burgeoning scientiﬁc discoveries of his age,133 Milton never succumbed
to the scientistic fallacy of wanting to accord signiﬁcance in his quest
130
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for understanding only to matters that can be rigorously observed and
measured.134 The long term is what mattered most in his mature intellectual universe, notwithstanding the need to rely heavily on unprovable teachings of history and suppositions about character, behavior, and tendency that such a priority entails.
In taking the long view, and refusing to be paralyzed by the obvious difﬁculty of predicting future consequences, Milton addresses a
structural difﬁculty of the case for protecting free speech. The harms
that unpopular speech—the kind that generates regulatory responses—
can cause are often salient in the short run, the beneﬁts less so. That is
especially true of the beneﬁts from speech that relate to character development, necessarily a slow process. Similarly, giving due regard to
beneﬁts that take the form of providing ideas or observations that future inquirers can put to better use than can their originators requires
both a long-term perspective and an appreciation of how this dynamic
has virtually deﬁned the course of learning throughout history. Even
the more speciﬁc beneﬁt of correcting error by means of refutation is
seldom realized directly, expeditiously, and without relapse. One-onone persuasion usually is a matter of creating doubt that leads over time
to a change of mind. Moving the needle of public opinion by means of
reasoned argument or empirical demonstration rather than demagoguery typically is an even more drawn-out phenomenon.
Milton was well equipped to focus on the future and the arc of
history. Almost every day of his life was devoted to scriptural study (in
the original languages of Hebrew, Greek, and Aramaic), including of
course the prophecies that dominate the Old Testament. We think of
Milton primarily as a poet but he was also a historian, having written
a lengthy history of England and even a short history of Russia.135 His
considerable interest in Machiavelli was mainly in the Florentine’s
historiographic theories. It is no accident that the form of poetry that
from an early age Milton aspired to write was epic poetry, modeled on
his hero Virgil. Characteristically, Milton begins his multifaceted
introduction to Galileo, a meeting he mentions in Areopagitica. Milton, Areopagitica at 737–38
(cited in note 12).
134
Apart from disdain for simple-minded scientism, Milton experienced “ambivalence about
the new science” on account of what he took to be its adverse impact on sophisticated metaphysical inquiry, whether due to the exaltation of the mechanistic in the manner of Hobbes or
the categorical separation of the material and the spiritual in the manner of Descartes. See
Stephen M. Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers 135 (Cornell, 1991).
135

See Barbara K. Lewalski, The Life of John Milton 198 (Blackwell, 2000).

310

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2017

argument in Areopagitica with an effort to distill the lessons of history regarding the regulation of speech. He ends Paradise Lost with
an extended conversation in which the angel Michael narrates to
Adam two thousand years of the history to come in order that the
progenitor of the human race, about to be expelled from Eden, may
“[g]ood with bad expect to hear, supernal grace contending with the
sinfulness of man, thereby to learn true patience. . . .”136
The Areopagitica is vulnerable to modern criticism in that it does
not say much about the immediate and short-run harms that speech
can cause. This omission, if such it be, may well be due to Milton’s
assumption that what matters most is the long-term ledger. On the
subject of the supposed long-term costs of free printing, no less than
the long-term beneﬁts, he has a great deal to say. The most feared
long-term cost in his day—and quite possibly even in ours—was the
specter of incremental anarchy, the gradual unraveling of the achievements of civilization. It is no exaggeration to say that Milton’s addressing of that concern takes up fully half of his tract. The Areopagitica is at pains on almost every page to prove that the “bonds and
ligaments”137 that hold a political community together consist much
more of mutual trust and education in history and duty than in coercive measures. His many paeans to dynamism are about how order
depends on continual adaptation, renewal, and active “closing up truth
to truth.” The regulators who seek to stamp out the “much arguing,
much writing, many opinions” that grow out of those endeavors are
the real “dividers of unity,” he maintains.138
Besides disorder, the long-term cost that most concerned supporters of the Licensing Order was error. Here I mean something
different from heresy, which has connotations of separation and disobedience. Quite apart from those perceived moral and membership
failings, error was seen as a serious matter on account of its practical consequences. Clearly Milton believed, and argued fervently in
Areopagitica, that error is more likely to follow from the silencing of
independent thinkers and the entrenchment of received wisdom than
from any misleading that bold, subversive ideas might accomplish.
His reasons for holding that view are many, but most have in com136
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mon the quality of taking into account phenomena such as character
effects and corrective responses that play out over time. For example,
he says:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth,
so truth be in the ﬁeld, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting, to
misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew
Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter.139

Many commentators, Alexander Meiklejohn among them,140 have
cited this passage to discredit Milton, accusing him of ungrounded
optimism or reliance on a divine providence that many modern readers
do not believe in. Both charges are plausible, the second in fact irrefutable. But Milton’s claim about the strength of truth is more defensible regarding long-term patterns of understanding than it is for
short-run effects. Admittedly, over time error can be entrenched by
“the grip of custom”141 or compounded by misbegotten extrapolation.
Nevertheless, in an energetic, inquisitive society of the sort Milton
envisioned, were licensing to be lifted much weeding out of false beliefs
would very likely occur by means of both critical challenge and experiences of inefﬁcacy. Both correctives, however, take time.
My point here is not that Milton is necessarily right in his optimism about the strength of truth, rather that his taking the long view
is a distinctive contribution to the case for the freedom of speech
because it makes available a more defensible argument grounded
in the self-correcting dynamic of speech answering speech. Notice that
the plausibility of effective if delayed correction is much greater when
the harm that needs countering is the persuasive effect of false ideas.
Not all error resulting from speech is caused by ideas. Not all speech
harms derive from persuasion. Demagogic triggering of primordial,
correction-proof anxieties and prejudices, intrusive or disruptive acts
of communication, and costly methods of generating speech (such as
child pornography, political fundraising, and animal torture) cause
much of the harm that is traceable to speech. Milton’s long view does
not improve the assessment of communications that cause harm in
these ways. Accordingly, Areopagitica tells us little about whether and
how his understanding of the freedom of speech extends to disputes
139
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over such matters. His argument is about ideas and his claim is that
truth has an advantage over the long haul in the wars of persuasion.
X. Expiring and Reviving Liberty
In none of his writings does Milton better express his belief
in the power of persuasion over time than in the closing words of
The Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth, a pamphlet
written in anguish in 1660 to protest the headlong rush of the strifeweary English people to restore the Stuart monarchy. Blind, betrayed
by his countrymen and even by his erstwhile hero Cromwell,142 eligible for execution on account of his polemics in defense of the regicide, he remained unbowed. Risking his freedom and possibly his life,
he challenged the ascendant royalists by issuing an uncompromising
indictment of monarchical government. As other republicans were
busy trimming to protect their positions against the impending Restoration, he deﬁantly reafﬁrmed his commitment to the Good Old
Cause, ﬁnding succor in the prospect of eventual political renewal:
Thus much I should perhaps have said though I were sure I should have
spoken only to trees and stones, and had none to cry to, but with the
prophet, “O earth, earth, earth!” to tell the very soil itself what her perverse
inhabitants are deaf to. Nay, though what I have spoke should happen . . . to
be the last words of our expiring liberty. But I trust I shall have spoken
persuasion to abundance of sensible and ingenuous men, to some perhaps, whom God may raise of these stones to become children of reviving
liberty.143

Probably due to the intervention of friends in high places, when
the Stuart monarchy returned to rule England three months later,
Milton somehow escaped the executioner’s axe.144 Then he resumed
work on his half-completed, most ambitious project of persuasion
ever: an epic poem, addressed to his disillusioned, vanquished compatriots but also to posterity, designed amid defeat “to assert eternal
providence and justify the ways of God to men.”145
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